








Two Concepts of Social Situatedness in Science

The literature on the social situatedness of epistemic agents in science has tended to characterize their social locations in terms of a hierarchy of power relationships that characterize the larger society.  However, this concept does not exhaust the types of social relationships relevant to science.  A scientist’s social situation or location can also be characterized in terms of her professional social relations with other scientists, including relations with other scientists of equal status.  There are two reasons to consider this alternative notion of social location:  (1) The growth of knowledge depends upon critical interaction among scientists, including interaction among scientists who may be more or less equal in status.  We need to get clear about the sort of social locations within science that provide the best opportunities for such critical interaction and thus increase the likelihood that scientists will be able to make contributions to our knowledge. (2)  It provides a way to measure the degree to which groups or individuals are integrated or marginalized within the scientific community.  This in turn helps us to test claims about the extent to which members of groups that are considered marginalized in society at large are also marginalized in science.  
This essay draws on the Durkheimian notions of social integration and density of social relationships in order to explain the concept of social location within the scientific community.  Social integration has to do with interpersonal relationships within some normatively-governed, cooperative social institution.  For Durkheim, the social density of a society is a function of the quantity of social relationships, which depends on the social volume or total population as well as their geographical distribution and the available means of communication and transportation.  Taking our cue from Durkheim, we could then define the social density of a scientific community as a function of the quantity of professional social relationships among its members.  The denser the network of such relations to which a scientist belongs, the more highly-integrated she is into the scientific community.  The degree of integration also depends on the strength or quality of scientists’ professional relationships.  Quality has to do with frequency and length of contact, the extent of criticism received, and the social location of the epistemic agent with whom one has a relationship.  
Of course, the idea of social networks in science is hardly new.  However, greater use could be made of this idea and related concepts in order to get clear about social situatedness and marginalization in science and to test claims about their effects.

2.	Situated Knowledge and Standpoint Epistemology

Corresponding to the hierarchy and network concepts of social location are two different theses about the ways in which one’s social location may affect one’s potential to contribute to the growth of scientific knowledge:  (1) One says that a person’s social situation provides a particular perspective or set of experiences unique to that location.  (2) The other says that one’s social location shapes one’s opportunities for critical interaction with other scientists who can evaluate one’s putative knowledge claims.  Standpoint epistemologists have focused on the first.  However, the second thesis is also worth our attention if we are interested in the sort of hearing that are given to alternative points of view.
Although there are some exceptions, standpoint theorists have traditionally shared the following two theses:  the situated knowledge thesis and the privileged location thesis.  According to the situated knowledge thesis, what one knows or experiences reflects one’s social, cultural, and historical location.  As Alison Wylie puts it, one’s social location is defined at least in part by one’s position in a social hierarchy, but also by other economic, social, and cultural conditions:

What we experience and understand, the differential strengths and liabilities we develop as epistemic agents, are systematically shaped by our location in hierarchically structured systems of power relations, by the material conditions of our lives, by the relations of production and reproduction that shape our social interactions, and by the conceptual resources we rely on to interpret and represent these relations (Wylie, 2007, 574).

Standpoint theory adds to this the privileged location thesis, which says that some social locations are privileged in the sense of being more likely to produce true or reliable knowledge.  In particular, the oppressed because of their social position have experiential knowledge that is not available to their oppressors.  The privileged location thesis has its origins in the philosophies of Marx and Hegel.  For Hegel, the slave enjoyed an epistemically privileged position relative to his or her master; for Marx, the privileged location was that of the proletarian.  Marxist historical materialists assume that knowledge derives directly from experience, that better knowledge results from having fewer biases interfering with the gathering of experiential knowledge, and that those in positions of power have more biases while the oppressed have fewer.  Those who are in positions of power in society have minds clouded by the ideology that legitimizes their status, while the oppressed are relatively free of this ideology and thus enjoy an epistemic advantage over their oppressors.  Feminist standpoint theorists may reject the simple linear social hierarchies of Hegel and Marx.  But the idea of a hierarchy of power relations persists in the notion of a center of power surrounded by a periphery of oppressed groups.
However, as Kathleen Lennon (2004, 1017) reminds us, even members of peripheral or marginalized groups may have their prejudices.  Nor can one can simply assume that all members of a marginalized group share similar experiences.  Lennon also argues that a feminist epistemology thus anchored in experience would face the same problems that any other empiricist epistemology has faced at least since David Hume.  Wylie (2007, 572) adds that one cannot take the individual experience of members of oppressed groups as “bedrock,” drawing on Joan Scott’s (1991, 777) argument that this would foreclose inquiry into how individuals’ experiences are structured by social conditions.  Wylie (2003, 28) also says that it is not clear that anyone who has ever advocated standpoint theory as an epistemology has ever actually endorsed what she calls the “automatic privilege thesis.”  Harding (2007, 51), for instance, argues that a standpoint is never automatic but something that one must struggle to achieve.  It is not always obvious to someone that she is being oppressed and she may come to realize this only through discourse with others and analysis of her situation (Heckman 1997, 346).  Some standpoint theorists, such as Donna Haraway, Patricia Hill Collins, and Sara Ruddick, have entirely rejected the notion of a privileged social location (Heckman 1997, 351-52, 358).  
Rejecting the automatic privilege thesis, however, is only one condition for developing a more sophisticated view of the effect of social location on the production of knowledge.  A second condition has to do with the recognition that knowledge is a collective product.  Although historical materialism posits that what individuals think they know is shaped by social factors, it is not a fully social epistemology, insofar as it appears to assume that the knowledge producer is the individual, rather than the community.  For the historical materialist, the proletariat enjoys an epistemic privilege only because its individual members are relatively free of biases, due to their position in society, and not because the ways in which the proletarian community adjudicates putative knowledge claims are governed by a different set of norms than those that govern the bourgeoisie.  For the sophisticated theorist, what makes knowledge objective is less the cleansing of idols from the mind than exposing one’s ideas to criticism and test.  Biases are eliminated through intellectual give-and-take.  The reliability of our knowledge – and the elimination of biases – will be enhanced by increasing the participation of currently excluded groups.  Philosophers from John Stuart Mill to Helen Longino have maintained that the growth of knowledge depends upon a critical dialectic in which people with different points of view resulting from different sorts of experiences will be allowed to be heard.  Lennon (2003, 256-257) argues that it is not so much that marginal social positions are epistemically privileged, as that engagement with those who occupy these positions will bring into consideration points of view that will have an impact on the views of those who are not in marginal positions.  Similarly, Wylie (2003, 33) maintains that the experiences peculiar to their location may lead members of currently excluded groups to question certain assumptions made by those in power and to consider alternative hypotheses, points of view, or avenues of inquiry.
The interesting question then concerns the degree to which epistemic discourse is governed by norms that include or exclude the participation of members of marginalized groups.  However, in order to answer this question, we must have some way of measuring how well-integrated into the scientific community are those who represent marginalized groups within the larger society.  It is for this purpose that we need a concept of social location defined in terms of a scientist’s social relations with other members of the scientific community.  

3.	Social Integration and Marginalization

If reliable knowledge depended upon the collective examination of new ideas, then the more opportunities scientists had to submit their ideas to criticism, the greater would be the likelihood of their making contributions to science.  These opportunities should increase not simply with the size of the scientific community, but with the way that it is constituted.  
In The Division of Labor in Society ([1893] 1902, 241-243) and The Rules of Sociological Method (1895, 138-139), Durkheim distinguished what he called the social volume, or sheer number of individuals, from social or moral density, which has to do with the quantity of social relationships among these individuals.  The number of social relationships may increase with total population, with migration from rural to urban areas, or with technological developments regarding the means of communication and transportation.  He also distinguished social from merely economic relationships.  As mentioned above, social relations are those that are governed by the norms of some cooperative social institution, such as a club or church, while economic relations may be governed by law or even by force.  Subsequently, in Suicide (1897), he introduced the ideas of social integration, which has to do with the density of just the social relationships entered into by an individual, and social regulation, which has to do with economic relationships.​[1]​
To distinguish social from economic relationships is not to deny that some relationships in science can have both moral and economic aspects.  In a typical university laboratory, for instance, the post docs and grad students depend on senior scientists for their stipends and career advancement and the senior scientists count on these people to carry out much of the work they promised to do in their grant applications.  In a well-run lab, however, these relationships are not only economic but moral.  Junior scientists expect education and guidance from senior scientists and senior scientists trust junior scientists to carry out their experiments with care and report their results honestly.
The social relationships that concern us here are the professional relationships among working scientists, which are governed by norms such as honest reporting of results, trusting that others have reported their work honestly, and helping younger scientists launch their careers.  One could belong to dense networks of personal social relationships and yet not be well-integrated into the scientific community.  The social density of communities of researchers will depend on such things as the size of the field, where they work, the frequency of their professional society meetings, the number of their journals, and the availability of relevant on-line resources such as listservs.  
The degree to which a scientist is integrated into a community of researchers is not simply a function of the number of other scientists with which she has professional relationships, but the quality or strength of these relationships as well.  This would depend on such things as the frequency of contact with these scientists, the length of these contacts, and the extent of the criticisms received through these contacts.  It also matters with whom one has these relationships:  a discussion of one’s research with, say, a faculty member at a major research university may be more valuable than a similar discussion with someone at an obscure liberal arts college.  Similarly, criticisms received from a colleague who is on top of the current literature and publishes in leading journals may be more useful than comments from someone who is not up-to-date or publishes in lesser journals.  Of course, how quickly someone’s knowledge of the literature becomes dated will vary from field to field.  The network of professional relationships to which a scientist belongs is important not only for receiving criticism of one’s work, but also for having access to the most recent, unpublished work of other scientists in one’s field (Wray 2007, 97).
One could argue that if the quality of a scientist’s professional relationships depends at least in part on the positions held by those with whom she enjoys these relationships, that the quality of these relationships is in fact at least indirectly shaped by the hierarchy of power relationships in the larger society.  An additional premise in the argument would be that scientists at major research universities are more likely to receive research funding from such centers of power in the larger society as the United States Department of Defense and the pharmaceutical industry.  I grant that there is a connection between relations of power in society at large and status within the scientific community.  But it is neither simple nor straightforward.  In the United States, scientists do not regard as creative research the mere following-out of protocols set out by the Food and Drug Administration.  Similarly, within academic engineering, contract research, no matter how favorably it may be looked upon by the administration, is often looked down upon as mere testing and not genuine research.  In other words, the status of someone within the scientific community does not simply mirror the wealth and power of her source of funding, but is strongly influenced by norms internal to the scientific community.
There is another reason that one’s professional relationships in science do not simply mirror social hierarchies in the larger society.  One’s location in a network of professional relationships may change over time, as one advances in one’s career, meets new scientists, or perhaps changes field.  On the other hand, one’s location in hierarchies of class, gender, and race is less fluid.  For a standpoint theorist such as Nancy Hartsock (1997, p. 96), one’s location in a hierarchy of power does not necessarily change upon the realization that one is a member of an oppressed group.  
The density of professional relationships entered into by an individual scientist depends not just on her personal skills but also upon social, cultural, and institutional factors, not all of which reduce to the properties of individuals.  Hence, if in fact women scientists are less well-integrated into the scientific community, it may not be for their want of social skills.  Rather, it may have to do with such things as different cultural expectations and assumptions concerning men and women, the persistence of misogynist attitudes, especially by those in powerful positions, and the tension between the biological clock and the tenure clock.  Indeed, due to the gender-related challenges women face, they often leave science entirely.  But then if male scientists assume that women are more likely to leave the field, they will be less likely to invest their time and resources in developing professional relationships with them (cf. Pattatucci 1998, 3-4).  Given that men currently dominate the profession, women will then experience greater difficulty in getting critical feedback on their work (cf. Gaines 1998, 74-75).  This in turn will discourage more women from pursuing careers in science.  This situation is only exacerbated by the presence of sexual tensions between men and women.  Problems can range from outright sexual harassment to male scientists avoiding female colleagues due to their inability to separate professional from personal attachments.  
The quality of a scientist’s professional relationships also depends on the norms governing these relationships.  One could easily imagine a dense network of authoritarian relationships, but an authoritarian social network would be less likely to produce reliable knowledge than a more democratic one and authoritarian relationships would be of a lower quality than those governed by more democratic ideals.  Longino, for example, has argued that communities produce knowledge only to the extent that certain ideals are realized in them.  These include (1) public venues for criticism; (2) uptake of criticism, that is, theories, hypotheses, and other ideas change over time in response to criticism; (3) public standards for the criticism and evaluation of putative knowledge claims; and (4) a “tempered equality” of intellectual authority among those criticizing and evaluating putative knowledge claims, that is, an equality that is tempered or qualified because of differences in intellectual abilities, educational background, and so on (Longino 2002, 128-131).  Critics such as Miriam Solomon and Alan Richardson (2005, 215) have expressed doubts about the need for the fourth ideal, arguing that it played little role in the scientific revolution.  One could of course reply that to the extent this ideal is realized today, that scientists enjoy higher quality relationships with each other than they did in earlier centuries.  
However, the point here is not so much to defend Longino’s particular analysis of the sort of democratic ideals that govern science, as to argue that the more these or a similar set of ideals are realized in a scientific community, the more socially integrated it is.  A Durkheimian might say that an authoritarian network is closer to being regulated than integrated.  Social integration has to do with relationships within a normatively-governed, cooperative institution.  Although perhaps Durkheim may not have fully appreciated this point, belonging to such an institution and following its rules is voluntary.  There is a difference between guiding one’s actions in accordance with the norms of an institution and being commanded to conform by those in power.  The latter is less conducive to criticizing the prevailing wisdom or offering up new ideas.
All other things being equal, one would expect that work that has been produced by scientists who have more and higher quality social relations with other scientists will be more reliable than work produced by those who are less well integrated into the scientific community.  The notion of social integration provides a way of defining marginality that can explain how it is that marginalized scientists are not able to make as many contributions to the growth of knowledge.  It is the marginalization itself that accounts for this, if to be marginalized means to be less well-integrated into the social network of scientists, to have fewer colleagues to whom to turn for feedback, or to have one’s potential contributions ignored.  If individuals who represent certain gender or ethnic groups find themselves marginalized in science, this may be due to characteristics of the larger society.  For instance, if they do not have the same educational opportunities as everyone else, then they will be less likely to become integrated into the scientific community.




It may not be possible to adduce direct evidence for the claim that scientists who are more well-integrated into the scientific community are more likely to produce results that are reliable or that possess some other epistemic virtue.  Such claims contain evaluative concepts and thus any putative evidence that these virtues are best realized under certain sorts of conditions will always be subject to critics’ value judgments about the degree to which these virtues have in fact been realized.  However, we may be able to provide indirect evidence for the claim by substituting some relatively less problematic measure such as number of publications for such normative epistemic concepts as truth, reliability, or empirical adequacy.  
We can assume that the degree to which a scientist engages in collaborative research is an indicator of the degree to which she is integrated into the scientific community.  Wray (2002, 157) reports on some empirical sociological work that shows a connection between collaboration and productivity in science, at least as measured by number of publications.  For instance, Diana Crane (1972, 50), in her studies of mathematicians and rural sociologists, found that more productive scientists had more relationships with other scientists in their research area than did less productive scientists.  The level of productivity of scientific communities as well as that of individual scientists varies with the density of social relationships.  Crane (1972, 25) contrasted her mathematicians and rural sociologists with two other research areas in mathematics and the social sciences in which the level of interpersonal communication was low, and found that the rate of growth of publication was also low.  Wray (2002, 157-158) also reports that Joseph Ben-David and Lydia Aran (1991) found that among Israeli medical researchers who had done their post-docs abroad, those who continued to communicate more frequently with the scientists they had met outside Israel were more productive.  There is also some evidence that those who are more well-integrated into the scientific community produce not just more but better work, if we can take Nobel prizes as indicators of quality.  Wray (2002, 152) mentions that Harriett Zuckerman (1977) discovered that Nobel laureates tend to collaborate more often than non-laureates.




Scientists’ social situations within the scientific community, defined in terms of their professional relationships, may help to explain the likelihood of their making contributions to the growth of knowledge. To be sure, the average degree of integration or marginalization in the scientific community for various social groups may be due in large part to characteristics of the larger society, such as attitudes towards members of these groups.  However, in order to explain any individual’s potential for contributing to science, we must look to her individual level of social integration within the scientific community.  In order to make a contribution to the growth of  knowledge, it is more important for an individual scientist to be highly integrated into a dense network of scientists than to be free of biases.  It is for this reason that men have been more likely than women to make contributions to science.
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^1	 Note 	This distinction is implicit in his theory of the four causes of suicide.  The four causes of suicide correspond to excessive or insufficient social integration and regulation.  For example, insufficient regulation occurs in economic crises; bachelors experience insufficient integration.
